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Abstract
What is the actual rate of sexual recidivism given the well‐
known fact that many crimes go unreported? This is a
difficult and important problem, and in “The dark figure of
sexual recidivism,” Nicholas Scurich and Richard S. John
(2019) attempt to make progress on it by “estimat[ing]
actual recidivism rates . . . given observed rates of reof-
fending” (p. 171). In this article, we show that the math in
their probabilistic model is flawed, but more importantly,
we demonstrate that their conclusions follow ineluctably
from their empirical assumptions and the unrepresentative
empirical research they cite to benchmark their calcula-
tions. Scurich and John contend that their analysis un-
dermines what they call the “orthodoxy in academic circles”
(p. 173) of low sexual recidivism rates among individuals
convicted of sexual offenses, but we underscore that their
article does not analyze data in the traditional sense;
instead, it just interprets past scholarly work through the
use of strong assumptions in a way that, for practitioners, is
likely to be opaque and misleading (and, for us, strays into
speculation, argument, or advocacy and away from objec-
tive research). Our simple calculations show that their
findings are highly sensitive to their assumptions, and we
conclude that courts and others should recognize Scurich
and John's work for what it is—a set of complex hypo-
theticals that are no more reliable than what judges and
lawyers accomplish on their own by simply recognizing the
basic problem that not all sexual offenses are reported.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
In their article “The dark figure of sexual recidivism,” Nicholas Scurich and Richard S. John (2019) wrestle with a
difficult and important problem: What is the actual rate of sexual recidivism given the well‐known fact that many
crimes go unreported? Scurich and John begin by describing the controversy over the incidence of sexual offense
recidivism. Courts and the public believe that sexual offense recidivism is really high, whereas most empirical
studies have found sexual recidivism to be quite low. “Based on the assumption that the empirical studies are
correct in their conclusion that sexual recidivism rates are ‘low’,” Scurich and John write, “academic commentary
has universally castigated the enactment of laws and statutes that are ostensibly predicated on a ‘high’ recidivism
rate” (p. 159).
Yet Scurich and John are deeply critical of these recidivism studies. They offer no specific methodological
challenge to any of them, except their general assertion that “the vast majority of the academic studies” use charges
or convictions as a measure for recidivism, which “underestimates the actual rate of recidivism” (p. 160). Instead
they claim that these studies are flawed because they fail to take into account unreported offenses. Scurich and
John point to two types of data that “speak to the magnitude of the dark figure (of sexual recidivism)” (p. 161). They
turn first to victim self‐report data as measured by a variety of sources, including the National Crime Victimization
Survey. These sources supposedly show that “at a minimum, a majority of sexual offenses do not get reported by
victims to the police” (p. 162).1 Scurich and John then look to offender self‐report data. They cite several studies
that they claim demonstrate how much more common actual sexual recidivism is relative to the rates reported by
official crime statistics.
To try to estimate this “dark figure of sexual recidivism” with some measure of precision, Scurich and John
carry out a probabilistic simulation exercise that incorporates victim self‐report data and different assumptions
about the chances of an individual being convicted of a new sexual offense (given that the crime is reported) in
order to approximate a measure of actual sexual offense recidivism. Their model assumes that offending rates are
constant over time, and they calibrate it with reported recidivism rates from four different studies. Scurich and
John conclude that “under any realistic assumptions, the rate of actual sexual recidivism is substantially larger than
the rate of observed sexual recidivism” (p. 173).2
Scurich and John maintain that their findings undermine what they term “the orthodoxy in academic circles,”
namely empirical claims that sexual recidivism rates are “single digit/low teen” (p. 173). Such claims, Scurich and
John write, are “specious and seriously betray the reality of sexual recidivism” (p. 173). Research, they say, should
be conducted differently: “[I]t is untenable for researchers to rely exclusively on sexual recidivism that is based on
official crime statistics [because] the majority of sexual recidivism is not detected by such a definition” (p. 172).
Court proceedings, they assert, have also been impacted: “[G]iven that observed recidivism may be such a small
sliver of actual recidivism, serious questions arise about the appropriateness of using actuarial risk assessment
instruments trained to predict observed recidivism to address legal issues that are concerned with actual recidivism”
(p. 172).3 The solution, Scurich and John imply, is to use their probabilistic model because it “allows us to estimate
actual recidivism rates . . . given observed rates of reoffending” (p. 171).
Of course, any attempt to undermine the consensus of an entire field should be supported—like all scholarly
research—by careful analysis and sound reasoning. It should also be scrutinized by peers to better understand the
precise contours of the contribution. In this piece, we take a close look at Scurich and John's methods and, in
particular, their assumptions. We are not the only ones who resolved to critically assess Scurich and John's analysis
when it was published in 2019. Abbott (2020) discusses many of the same issues we identify (and many we do not),
ultimately concluding that Scurich and John's mix of strategies and assumptions “effectively invalidates their
findings” (p. 543). Nevertheless, our work, conducted concurrently with Abbott (2020), makes a number of distinct
contributions to the conversation about the usefulness and reliability of Scurich and John's conclusions, including
by formally replicating and probing the robustness of their underlying empirical estimates. Our goal is to ensure
that nontechnical consumers of Scurich and John (2019) understand exactly what their research does and what it
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does not do, what sorts of claims it can be used to support, and which would be inappropriate. We hope our
treatment proves to be a useful resource for practitioners, lawyers, and judges as they seek to better understand
sexual recidivism.
We begin by explaining how Scurich and John's probabilistic simulation model works before evaluating the
underlying data and the empirical assumptions that animate it. We then look more carefully at the mathematics
behind the model itself. We conclude that there are significant limitations to their work and that, as we will explain,
their inferences about the likely scope of the “dark figure” are interesting solely as an academic exercise. What is
most critical is that their conclusions are essentially driven by assumptions that are not themselves rooted in data
or empirical research. In this important sense, their paper is not an empirical one, and researchers, courts, and
policy‐makers should reject the inferences Scurich and John draw from their probabilistic modeling exercise as
uninformative about actual sexual recidivism.
2 | PROBABILISTIC SIMULATION MODEL
To “estimate” the rate of actual sexual recidivism for non‐incarcerated individuals previously convicted of sexual
offenses, Scurich and John (2019) build a probabilistic simulation model. Their specific focus is the sexual offense
rate of men who were convicted of a sexual crime at some earlier time and have since been released from custody
after serving their sentence. Their model purports to estimate mean rates of actual recidivism, conditional on a
distribution of the number of reoffenses (with mean µ0) over the population and on fixed probabilities for reporting
(Pr < 1) and successful prosecution (Pc < 1) for each offense (p. 164). In other words, there exists an unobserved
actual recidivism rate, which is translated into an “observed” rate for a population by, in effect, multiplying the
former by Pr and Pc. From this perspective, Scurich and John just repeat the very standard notion that actual
recidivism is higher than observed (e.g., conviction) recidivism because some crimes are not reported or do not
result in conviction. In very rough terms, they argue that one must “inflate” the observed rate by 1/(Pr�Pc) to arrive
at the “actual” rate, but they assume values of Pr and Pc rather than estimate them.
4
2.1 | Modeling recidivism
To develop their model, Scurich and John conduct a series of simulations using different values for the key pa-
rameters: µ0, Pr, and Pc. Everything in the paper follows from the assumptions about these values and their dis-
tributions. Each simulation consists of the following steps:
1. Start with 100 hypothetical “offenders” (each individual indicated by i¼ 1–100).
2. Assume that the average number of sexual offenses per offender across all offenders over the time period in
question is µ0.
5
3. Randomly assign an average number of sexual offenses (λi) to each of the 100 offenders [λi ∼ exponentialðµ0Þ]
over some number of time periods.6
4. Using the individual means (λi), randomly draw the number of offenses committed by each offender (Si)
[Si ∼ PoissonðλiÞ] in the given period.
5. Assume that all sexual offenses have the same probability of being reported (Pr), that whether each offense is
reported is independent of whether other offenses are reported, and that the number of sexual offenses that
are reported for individual i is Ri [Ri ∼ binomialðSi; PrÞ].
6. Assume that all reported sexual offenses have the same probability of resulting in a conviction (Pc), that
whether a reported sexual offense results in a conviction is independent of whether other offenses result in
conviction, and that the number of sexual offense convictions for individual i is Ci [Ci ∼ binomialðRi; Pc)].
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7. Determine whether each offender commits one or more offenses (Ns) in the simulation's draws from the
distributions (i.e., Ns ¼ 1 if Si ≥ 1 and Ns ¼ 0 if Si ¼ 0)
8. Likewise, determine whether each offender is convicted for one or more offenses (Nc) (i.e., Nc ¼ 1 if Ci ≥ 1 and
Nc ¼ 0 if Ci ¼ 0).
9. Calculate the “actual” recidivism rate by dividing the number of offenders that commit one or more offenses
(Ns) by the total number of offenders (100).
10. Calculate the “observed” recidivism rate by dividing the number of offenders that are convicted for one or
more offenses (Nc) by the total number of offenders (100).
11. Take steps 1 through 10 and repeat them 1,000 times, saving the calculated recidivism rates for each of the
1,000 trials.
12. Determine the “actual” and “observed” recidivism rates by taking the average of these 1,000 trials.
It is important to emphasize again that Scurich and John start with exactly three values (µ0, Pr, and Pc) as well as
the generic exponential, Poisson, and binomial distributions. There are no real‐world “data” in these exercises. They
run Monte Carlo simulations using a three‐way factorial design of different values for the parameters µ0, Pr, and Pc
(p. 167). With nine possible values for µ0, three values for Pr, and three values for Pc, they have (9� 3� 3¼Þ 81
separate combinations and thus 81 simulations. Again, each simulation occurs by conducting 1,000 independent
trials to calculate average “observed” recidivism for the given values of µ0, Pr, and Pc, although Monte Carlo sim-
ulations are not actually necessary—closed form solutions are possible given their approach; math alone would have
been sufficient (Figure 1).
2.2 | Distribution assumptions
Scurich and John do not know how recidivism risk varies across individuals based on observable characteristics
(e.g., crime of conviction, treatment status, etc.), and they do not know how recidivism varies over the course of an
individual's lifetime or other temporal periods (e.g., age, time elapsed since release, etc.). To introduce differences at
the individual level, Scurich and John assume that behavior is governed by draws from known distributions rather
than assuming that all offenders are identical. These distributions introduce noise, but if we are interested in
“average rates” and we are willing to stipulate to a large number of hypothetical offenders, this variation at the
individual level eventually cancels itself out.
In any event, Scurich and John make two key assumptions regarding the distribution of individual propensities
to recidivate in order to run their simulations. These assumptions allow them to pick a single parameter (and vary it
to explore the consequences of changing the parameter) to manufacture a range of different individual tendencies.
First, they assume that individual propensities to reoffend (λi) follow an exponential distribution (p. 164). The
exponential distribution has a single parameter, µ0, which represents the average number of sexual offenses
committed per individual across all individuals during the relevant time period. With µ0 and the distribution, one
can create a “fan” of hypothetical individuals around an “average” individual. Second, Scurich and John assume that
the number of sexual offenses for a specific individual in the population of offenders in a given time period follows a
Poisson distribution (p. 164). The Poisson distribution of offenses for each offender has a single parameter, the
mean, which is assumed to remain constant over time (p. 165).
In other words, the simulations begin with Scurich and John assuming the average number of offenses
committed by potential recidivists, and then selecting off‐the‐shelf distributions of random variables to abstract
away from a single representative individual in order to generate the appearance of a real‐world population. But
these off‐the‐shelf distributions have well‐known and straightforward properties, and with enough draws (e.g.,
1,000), the population will have precise and predictable behaviors (i.e., the expected value and variance of reof-
fending is knowable in advance without any simulations whatsoever), meaning that there are no surprises. The
conclusions follow ineluctably from these assumptions.
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2.3 | Parameter assumptions
In order to simulate a recidivism rate—that is, in order to calculate the consequences of their assumptions—for
hypothetical individuals at risk of reoffending, Scurich and John must also assume values for their three unob-
served parameters.
The first parameter, µ0, is the average number of offenses per offender across all offenders over the period, and
choosing a specific value operationalizes the exponential‐distribution assumption the authors make. In effect,
Scurich and John constrain the sum of the number of offenses committed by all 100 hypothetical individuals (and
divided by 100) to equal µ0. Each offender's average number of offenses (λi) in a time period is determined by a
random draw from the exponential distribution with the population average (µ0) set to a specific value.
The true population average of offenses per offender is unknown, so Scurich and John consider an expansive
range of possible values and focus on those values that generate, under strong assumptions, the observed rates of
sexual offense recidivism indicated by a select few papers in the literature. Specifically, they consider nine different
exponential distributions of populations with means of 1/16, 1/8, 1/4, 1/2, 1, 2, 4, 8, and 16 sexual offenses per year
(p. 166). For example, in the simulation that sets µ0 at 16, Scurich and John assume that the average number of
offenses across all 100 hypothetical individuals is 16 (only some of which will be reported and result in conviction),
but they allow individuals to have different individual averages over time (so long as, at the aggregate level, the
number of offenses averages out to 16 across all 100 hypothetical individuals), drawn from the exponential dis-
tribution, so that the 100 individuals are not identical in all respects.
The second parameter, the probability of an offense being reported to law enforcement, Pr, attempts to ac-
count for unreported sexual offenses. Scurich and John do not know the likelihood that a sexual offense will be
reported, and they do not know what percentage of sexual offenses become known to the police. To simplify
matters, in assigning possible values to the variable on reporting, Pr, Scurich and John assume that the probability
that any committed sexual offense will be reported is constant across all offenses and individuals (p. 167). They then
select three possible values: a low estimate (0.15) from a study by Daly and Bouhours (2010), an intermediate
estimate (0.35) from the National Crime Victimization Survey (Planty et al., 2013), and what they call an optimistic
estimate (1.0) in which every sexual offense is reported. The estimates Scurich and John borrow from Daly and
Bouhours and the National Crime Victimization Survey are the only real‐world data in their model other than the
“observed” recidivism estimates (drawn from a few papers in the existing literature) that the authors use for
benchmarking, which we discuss in depth later.
Finally, Scurich and John must assume a likelihood that a reported offense will result in a conviction, Pc—that is,
a crime that would be “counted” in a conviction‐based measure of sexual recidivism. For various reasons, the police
may become aware of a crime and even be confident about the individual who committed it but may not be able to
secure a conviction that ultimately counts as an observed instance of recidivism. Just as with Pr, Scurich and John
assume the chance of success is constant across individuals and across different offenses (p. 167). This assumption
makes their effort a simple one; they need only pick possible values for the probability that a reported sexual
offense ends with a successful prosecution. Scurich and John consider the following values for Pc: 0.25, 0.50, and
0.75. They do not explore the consequences of an “optimistic estimate” such as Pc ¼ 1:0.
3 | UNDERLYING DATA: RECIDIVISM
With this overview of Scurich and John's model in hand, we are ready to critically examine the objectives, as-
sumptions, and conclusions of their analysis. We begin with the only remaining (but necessary) input to their model:
an estimate of the “observed” recidivism rate. This input allows them to back‐out an underlying “actual” recidivism
rate (given their assumptions about reporting and prosecution success probabilities), which they use to inform their
choice of µ0 in their simulations. We raise two concerns about their paper here. First, Scurich and John include Pc in
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their model on the assumption that observed recidivism rates in the literature are conviction‐based recidivism
rates. This assumption is unsound. Second, Scurich and John select studies for their benchmarking that report
“observed” recidivism rates that are systematically higher than an even‐handed and comprehensive review of the
literature tolerates. These choices have the effect of dramatically increasing their constructed “actual” recidivism
rates.
Scurich and John state that the “primary objective” of their paper “is to stimulate thought and critical reflection
about the near‐universal practice of limiting the definition of sexual recidivism to a new legal charge or conviction
for a sexual offense” (p. 172). This is a surprising claim given that researchers have called mere rearrest “one of the
most common measures found in recidivism research” (Sample & Bray, 2006, p. 92). An arrest entails some law
enforcement activity but does not require a prosecutor to file a charge or a judge to enter a conviction, and rearrest
seems especially likely to follow a report when the suspected individual is known, has a record, and is possibly
publicly registered. Indeed, false or misattributed reports might even lead to an arrest‐based recidivism rate
exceeding the actual recidivism rate.
Although it is true that some of the studies Scurich and John cite in their article use charges and convictions to
measure recidivism, many do not. Indeed, the largest and most recent recidivism studies—which Scurich and John
omit from their article and which we discuss below—use arrests. These studies examine arrest patterns to reduce
the chance of arriving at a false negative or making a type II error—that is, classifying someone as not having
committed a new crime when in fact they have, exactly Scurich and John's concern. Langan et al. (2003) are explicit
about these potential benefits in their 2003 Department of Justice study: “Between rearrest and reconviction as
the recidivism measure, the one less likely to make that type of error is rearrest. One reason is that the rigorous
standard used to convict someone—‘proof beyond a reasonable doubt'—makes it certain that guilty persons will
sometimes go free. Another reason is record‐keeping: the justice system does better at recording arrests than
convictions in RAP sheets. For such reasons, this study uses rearrest more often than reconviction as the measure
of recidivism” (p. 6).7
At the outset, our critique of what might be called Scurich and John's misplaced emphasis on a known issue in
recidivism studies may seem a bit persnickety. However, as we show below, their focus on conviction‐based
measures of recidivism and their choice of which studies to incorporate into their benchmarking analysis, along
with many other choices along the way, turn out to matter a lot—in predictable ways—in terms of their ultimate
conclusion that actual sexual recidivism rates are much higher than observed recidivism rates.
3.1 | Omitted studies
The Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Statistics has published three important studies on sexual recidivism.
All of them use arrest as their primary measure of recidivism. In their oft‐cited 2003 study, Langan et al. (2003)
follow 9,691 individuals who had been incarcerated for a sexual offense and were released from prison in 1994 in
15 states across the country. They find that 5.3% were rearrested for a new sexual crime within three years. In their
well‐known report, Durose et al. (2016) study 20,422 individuals imprisoned for sexual offense convictions who
were released across 30 states in 2005. They find that 5.6% were arrested for a new rape or sexual assault within
five years. In May 2019—after the publication of Scurich and John's article—the DOJ released an additional report
examining an estimated 20,195 individuals released from prison in 30 states in 2005 following a term of incar-
ceration for one or more sexual offenses. The authors of the report find that 7.7% were rearrested for a new rape
or sexual assault within nine years (Alper & Durose, 2019).
In 2016, the Probation and Pretrial Services Office of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts published a
study on the recidivism of individuals convicted of sexual offenses under federal supervision (Cohen &
Spidell, 2016). The data came from 94 federal judicial districts and involved the records of 7,416 males with sexual
offense convictions who were released from federal prison and placed on supervision during fiscal years 2007
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through 2013. The authors of the study define recidivism as arrest for a new crime.8 Cohen and Spidell take a
subsample of those on active supervision and find that 2.8% were rearrested for a new sexual offense within three
years.
There have also been recent large state‐wide studies that use arrests to measure sexual offense recidivism. For
instance, in 2007, the Minnesota Department of Corrections published research evaluating the recidivism patterns
of 3,166 individuals released in Minnesota following conviction and punishment for a sexual offense. The follow‐up
periods the researchers use range from 3 to 16 years, with an average of 8.4 years. During that period, 12% of
these releasees were rearrested for a new sexual offense; 10% were reconvicted, and 7% were reincarcerated.
Most individuals who recidivate do so within the first five years (Minnesota Department of Corrections, 2007).
Sample and Bray (2003) use arrest data on approximately 953,000 arrestees from 1990 to 1997 (collected by the
Illinois State Police) and find that approximately 6.5% of those in the sample who were originally arrested for a
sexual crime were rearrested for a new sexual crime within five years.
Other than mistaking the 2003 DOJ study as measuring recidivism using convictions when it explicitly focuses
on arrests (p. 159), Scurich and John do not include any of the above studies in their research. Instead, they rely on
studies that have much smaller sample sizes and mostly concern individuals who were released decades earlier.
Even more problematic, as they do with the 2003 DOJ study, Scurich and John claim that all of the studies they cite
use charges or convictions as their measure of recidivism notwithstanding the fact that many use other measures
less susceptible to type II errors. Their decision to leave these large‐scale recidivism studies out of their reckoning
with the literature as well as their analysis is all the more surprising given that they also characterize a small study
crafted to measure the accuracy of a particular predictive instrument (i.e., not recidivism) as a useful benchmarking
recidivism study.
3.2 | Included studies
Scurich and John use four studies to calibrate the probabilistic simulation model on which their analysis relies. The
first is a study by R. K. Hanson et al. (1993) that looks at the long‐term recidivism rate of 197 individuals previously
convicted of child molestation who were released from a maximum‐security prison in Ontario, Canada, between
1958 and 1974. The maximum follow‐up period in the study is 31 years. The offenders were divided into three
groups, and the average follow‐up periods were 19 years, 28 years, and 20 years respectively. This study finds that
42% of the sample were reconvicted for a “sexual offense, a violent offense, or both during the follow‐up period”
(p. 648).
This study has two problems beyond its age and small sample size. First, R. K. Hanson et al. (1993) include
violent offenses in their reoffense measure, which means we have no way of ascertaining from their study the
actual sexual offense recidivism rate. Second, they mention that there are 22 potential recidivists in their data for
whom the 1989 and 1991 Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) records are missing. Because these individuals
were over the age of 50 at the time of release, R. K. Hanson et al. assume they are dead. However, it is also possible
that their records are missing because they did not recidivate. As R. K. Hanson (2006) wrote in a later article, “[t]he
RCMP policies for retaining criminal records have changed through the years, but they have always been more
inclined to keep the records of active offenders (recidivists) than to keep those of inactive offenders (non‐re-
cidivists)” (p. 103).9 By characterizing these people as dead instead of as possible nonrecidivists, R. K. Hanson et al.
inflate the observed recidivism rates in their sample. On 10 July 2019, one of us (TRL) wrote to R. K. Hanson to ask
whether he agreed with this criticism. On 11 July 2019, R. K. Hanson responded, “I actually agree with your
criticism of my 1993 article. There is no easy answer to missing records, and I have coded things both ways in
different studies (one inflates and other deflates estimates).”10
Scurich and John also refer to a study by Prentky et al. (1997) that looks at the recidivism rates of individuals
with sexual offense convictions released over a 25‐year period (1959–1984) from the Massachusetts Treatment
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Center for Sexually Dangerous Persons in Bridgewater, Massachusetts, which was established “under special
legislation for the purpose of evaluating and treating individuals convicted of repetitive and/or aggressive sexual
offenses” (p. 637).11 Prentky et al. (1997) follow 251 individuals (136 previously convicted of rape and 115 of child
molestation) and measure recidivism by charge for a new sexual offense. In presenting this study, Scurich and John
should have clarified that, “[w]ithin the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, charge is a more inclusive category than
arrest (i.e., you may be charged without being arrested)” (p. 639‐640). They also should have explained that Prentky
et al.'s (1997) research studies an atypical, high‐risk sample, lest the reader think the article's results reflect the
long‐term risk posed by the average individual with a sexual offense conviction in their history. Indeed, Prentky
et al. explicitly warn of the dangers of such conflation, commenting that “[s]exual offenders sampled from general
criminal populations, from offenders committed to a state hospital, and from a maximum security psychiatric
hospital are likely to differ in ways that would affect their recidivism rates and make cross‐sample comparisons
difficult” (p. 636; internal citations omitted).
The study by R. K. Hanson and Bussière (1998) is a meta‐analysis of 61 studies released between 1943 and
1995 from the United States, Canada, the UK, Australia, Denmark, and Norway. The sample sizes range from 12 to
5,000 individuals, with a mean of 475 and a median of 198. The median follow‐up period is 4 years, and the average
is 5.5 years. The average sexual offense recidivism rate is 13.4%. Although Scurich and John are correct that “84%
of the studies contained in the meta‐analysis by R. K. Hanson and Bussière defined recidivism as a new conviction”
(p. 160), they fail to mention that 27 of the 61 studies (44%) use multiple indices of recidivism, and 15 studies (25%)
do not report the source of the recidivism information. A more accurate portrayal is that 54% of the studies define
recidivism as an arrest; 25% define it as a self‐report, and 16% define it as a parole violation–all of which are
broader than a charge‐ or conviction‐based definition. In addition, Scurich and John do not explain that the study
with the largest sample size (4,381–5,000) uses “an unusually broad definition of recidivism” because it includes
“treatment failure” (p. 351). This overbroad definition would seem to pose a problem for Scurich and John, since
presumably some individuals in the sample are classified as recidivists despite never committing a new sexual crime.
The final study that Scurich and John cite is a 2014 study by R. K. Hanson, Lunetta, et al. (2014). This study does
not seek to measure recidivism rates but instead aims to assess the predictive accuracy of the Static‐99 and Static‐
99R on a sample of 475 individuals with sexual offense convictions who were released from the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation in 2006–2007. R. K. Hanson, Lunetta, et al. (2014) follow the scoring
rules of the Static‐99 and exclude individuals whose only registrable sexual offense is child pornography, statutory
rape (consensual intercourse with a minor aged 14–17 years), or other consensual sexual activity with a minor aged
14–17 years. In addition, R. K. Hanson, Lunetta, et al. (2014) define recidivism as arrest for a sexual offense—both
contact offenses like child molestation and noncontact offenses like exhibitionism (but not failure to register). They
find that 4.8% (23/475) of individuals in the sample were arrested for a new sexual offense within five years.
Breaking that down further, 3.2% (15/475) were arrested for contact offenses and 1.7% (8/475) for noncontact
offenses.12
3.3 | Significance
Scurich and John tend to rely on studies with higher‐than‐average, unrepresentative recidivism rates and overlook
studies that report low recidivism rates. They use the studies we summarize above to benchmark their analysis, and
our review of available research suggests that important gaps in that effort are likely to bias their calculations in a
predictable way. In addition, even if we assume their selection of benchmaking studies is somehow approximately
representative, each of the articles includes important features or limitations that Scurich and John do not take into
account and that tend to inflate the measured recidivism rate—for example, the inclusion of nonsexual offenses as
“recidivism.” Finally, by incorrectly describing these studies as by and large measuring conviction‐based recidivism,
Scurich and John encourage policy‐makers to inappropriately adjust “observed” rates by taking into account the
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chance of successful prosecution (given that a victim has reported), which is an irrelevant consideration when the
recidivism rate in question is measured before prosecution. Indeed, three of the studies they cite use arrest or an
even more expansive definition of recidivism (like treatment failure). Not surprisingly, this biases upward their
hypothetical “actual” reoffending rate.
4 | UNDERLYING DATA: OFFENDER SELF‐REPORTS
Scurich and John also discuss conclusions from the literature using offender self‐report data to defend the idea that
“actual” recidivism rates are much higher than “observed” recidivism rates. To understand why their argument is
problematic, and why much of the research they cite is ultimately irrelevant, it is necessary to consider the defi-
nition of recidivism. According to the National Institute of Justice webpage, “Recidivism … refers to a person's
relapse into criminal behavior, only after the person receives sanctions or undergoes intervention for a previous crime”
(National Institute of Justice, 2020; emphasis added). Admittedly, individuals who repeatedly offend but who are
never caught and convicted are “recidivists” in an important sense, but these individuals are ignored by laws that
explicitly target individuals who have a criminal justice record of having committed a sexual offense. In the domain
of research that attempts to understand and document postconviction criminal behavior, the policy‐relevant chal-
lenge is to determine how likely an individual is to return to crime after being processed and punished by the
criminal justice system.
Turning to the research Scurich and John cite—only one, the Langevin et al. (2004) study, even purports to
measure recidivism in the relevant sense. The Abel et al. (1987) study, for instance, provides self‐reporting data
from paraphiliacs seeking treatment, but it does not offer any information about whether they were ever arrested,
charged, convicted, or punished for a crime. Likewise, Bourke et al. (2015) explicitly state that “[n]one of these
individuals (in any of the three samples) previously were arrested for a sexual offence” (p. 360). Buschman
et al. (2010) use polygraph tests to characterize undetected sexual crimes that were committed by 25 individuals
(unknown to the police before being arrested) who were receiving treatment for possession of child abuse images.
Similarly, Bourke and Hernandez (2009) use polygraphs to measure self‐reporting of undetected contact sexual
offenses by individuals with child pornography convictions in a voluntary, intensive, residential sexual offender
treatment program at a medium security prison, but “all disclosures are made post‐conviction and post‐sentencing”
(p. 189). Some of the participants had committed prior sexual offenses, but Bourke and Hernandez do not tell us
whether any admitted to undetected conduct that occurred after their first conviction. Ahlemeyer et al. (2000) also
use polygraphs to measure self‐reporting, but they “examine[] only the number of past victim and offense ad-
missions data” (p. 128). Although some of the subjects had prior criminal history, Ahlemeyer et al. (2000) provide no
information by which to discern whether the self‐reported undetected sexual offenses occurred before or after
their formal criminal history began—necessary information if we are to determine whether the self‐reported of-
fenses in their data ought to count as postconviction recidivism.
The Langevin et al. (2004) study presents different problems. In a 2006 article, Webster et al. (2006) describe
several “fundamental methodological weaknesses [that] seriously jeopardize the degree of confidence that we may
have in [Langevin et al.'s (2004)] findings” (p. 89). The first deficiency has to do with the generalizability of their
findings. All of the individuals in the study were referred for psychiatric assessment or treatment, which “… is
typically reserved for a minority of those charged with sex offences. In all likelihood, this sub‐group represents an
unusually high proportion of the more serious or atypical sex offenders charged during this period” (p. 83). Although
Langevin et al. (2006) defend Langevin et al. (2004) by pointing out that “treatment has been widely provided to sex
offenders in [Canadian] federal penitentiaries” (p. 110), they do not supply any information about the kinds of
psychiatric disorders for which the individuals in their sample were receiving treatment, nor do they disclose the
hospital providing treatment, or the kinds of treatment the hospital provided.13 We do know that some of the
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comparison subjects had been charged with violent offenses like murder (p. 537), which indicates that the hospital
was treating high‐risk individuals and not typical sexual offenders.
In addition, the Langevin et al. (2004) study has limited relevance for assessing risk in a sentencing hearing, and
it should not be used to justify control measures like registration requirements or residency restrictions imposed on
individuals with prior sexual offense convictions. Langevin et al. (2004) measure the lifetime criminal history of 320
individuals with sexual crime convictions and 31 individuals with nonsexual violent crime convictions who received
treatment at an unidentified hospital in Canada. Notably, “[t]he first arrest, charge, or conviction was used as the
index marker event, and all subsequent charges or convictions were considered instances of recidivism” (p. 538).
Using an arrest or charge is unusual in a recidivism study, as most use at least an initial conviction to mark an
individual as someone who is at risk of reoffending following justice‐system intervention. More importantly, Lan-
gevin et al. (2004) acknowledge that “a total of 46 (14.6%) of the 316 sex offenders on whom data were available
had never appeared in court on a sexual offence” (p. 542).14 An additional 87 people (27.5%) appeared only once,
and the study provides no indication that these individuals were ever convicted of a sexual crime. As a conviction
for a sexual crime is a threshold requirement for sentencing and the subsequent attachment of registration obli-
gations, community notification requirements, and residence restrictions in the United States, “recidivism” of
people who have never been convicted or even charged with a sexual offense is of limited relevance to assessing
the risk of the policy‐relevant population—individuals with sexual offense convictions.
5 | EMPIRICAL ASSUMPTION: CONSTANT RATE OF OFFENDING OVER TIME
In calculating their hypothetical “actual” recidivism rates, Scurich and John assume that an individual's probability
of reoffending remains constant over time. In other words, a person's chance of reoffending is the same at year one
as it is at year 25. Scurich and John acknowledge that this assumption may be problematic: “For short periods of
time (a few years), this may be a reasonable assumption. However, for longer time periods of several years or
decades, this assumption may well be violated” (p. 171). As it turns out, their assumption of a constant rate of
reoffending is demonstrably wrong over any period, and this simplifying assumption has nontrivial consequences,
again, inflating their estimates of recidivism—specifically, ignoring the dramatic reduction in criminal propensity
over time implies that individuals who were released even a few years prior have much higher recidivism levels than
they actually do.
5.1 | Time since release
One of the most well‐established findings in criminology is that the likelihood that someone will reoffend declines
with each year after release that the individual has remained offense‐free (Blumstein & Nakamura, 2009). Kurly-
chek et al. (2012) report that “[t]he general tendency for recidivism risk to decline over time is among the best
replicated results in empirical criminology. It is probably not an exaggeration to say that any recidivism study with
more than a 2‐ or 3‐year follow‐up period that did not find a downward‐sloping marginal hazard would be
immediately suspect” (p. 75). There is ample evidence that this general conclusion applies just as well to those
convicted of sexual offenses.
For instance, a steep downward trend in recidivism risk is evident in the 2003 and 2019 DOJ studies. (Un-
fortunately, the 2016 DOJ study does not provide the information we need to analyze this trend.) According to the
2003 DOJ report, individuals with a prior sexual offense conviction in the United States are most likely to be
arrested in the first year after their release, with the recidivism rate declining every subsequent year. Of the 517
individuals released following a sexual offense conviction and who are later rearrested, 40% (205) are rearrested in
the first year, 34% (176) in the second, and 26% (136) in the third.
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The 2019 DOJ study documents a similar downward trend. Table 1 shows the percentage of prisoners released
in 30 states in 2005 after serving a sentence for rape or sexual assault who are rearrested for rape/sexual assault
by year following release. The first row shows the cumulative percentage of prisoners arrested each year, up to a
total of 7.7% within the 9‐year follow‐up period. The second row presents the percentage change of individuals
rearrested each year. Table 1 demonstrates that released individuals who will eventually be rearrested are most
often rearrested within the first year (1.9%), and other than blips in years 5, 7, and 8, the percentage of those newly
rearrested declines steadily in subsequent years.
This phenomenon holds true without regard to the initial reoffense risk that an individual with a sexual offense
conviction poses at the time of release: whether it begins high or low, recidivism risk appears to decline over the
sexual offense‐free years following release (R. K. Hanson, Harris, et al., 2014; R. K. Hanson et al., 2018).
5.2 | Age
In addition, research comfirms that, just as with individuals convicted of other kinds of crime, the reoffense risk of
someone with a prior sexual offense conviction drops with age. In a 2002 study, R. K. Hanson uses data from 10
follow‐up studies of adult males aged 18–70 and above with sexual offense convictions (generating a combined
sample of 4,673 individuals) to study the relationship between age and sexual recidivism (R. K. Hanson, 2002). He
finds that, “[i]n the total sample, the recidivism rate declined steadily with age,” and “[t]he association was linear”
(p. 1053).
Prentky and Lee (2007) also explore the age effect on a cohort of 136 individuals previously convicted of rape
and 115 individuals convicted of child molestation, both groups with multiple priors, who had been civilly
T A B L E 1 Cumulative and marginal sexual offense rearrest rates15
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9
Cumulative rearrest rate 1.9% 3.5% 4.4% 5.1% 5.9% 6.3% 6.9% 7.6% 7.7%
Marginal rearrest rate +1.6 +0.9 +0.7 +0.8 +0.4 +0.6 +0.7 +0.1
F I G U R E 2 Sexual offense recidivism rate post‐release17 [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.
com]
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committed in a Massachusetts prison, released in 1959, and followed for the subsequent 25 years. They establish
that, for individuals convicted of rape, recidivism drops linearly as a function of age. For individuals convicted of
child molestation, recidivism increases from age 20 to age 40 and then declines at age 50 and significantly by age
60. The 2019 DOJ study came to similar conclusions. Alper and Durose (2019) discover that 11.8% of individuals
age 24 or younger with a prior sexual offense conviction are rearrested for a new sexual offense as compared with
4.6% of those age 40 or older—that is, younger individuals are slightly more than twice as likely to be rearrested for
a new sexual offense. Other researchers report similar results (see, e.g., Barbaree et al., 2009; Lussier &
Healey, 2009; Lussier et al., 2010; Monahan et al., 2017; Wollert et al., 2010).
5.3 | Significance
Assuming the rate of reoffending remains constant over time ignores the abundant evidence showing that the
opposite is usually true. Scurich and John's reliance on this assumption falsely elevates the projected hypothetical
“actual” recidivism levels they calculate over longer periods of time, making potential recidivists appear more
dangerous than they really are as the years pass—and increasingly so as they age. For the same reason, measures
such as “5‐year recidivism rates” are misleading in the sense that any tendency toward reoffending is heavily
concentrated in the first few years. This aspect of the temporal pattern of recidivism matters as policy‐makers
consider how to set certain legal requirements such as the minimum duration of registration and notification
obligations. Using the 2019 DOJ study as a benchmark, policy‐makers could very reasonably conclude that if an
individual convicted of a sexual offense has not recidivated within 9 years, his registration and notification re-
quirements, as well as his residency restrictions, should be terminated or at least dramatically curtailed.
6 | UNDERLYING DATA: VICTIM SELF‐REPORT
The third variable in Scurich and John's probabilistic model is Pr, the probability that a victim or some other party
will report a sexual offense to the police. In identifying reasonable values to assume for Pr, Scurich and John make
use of victim‐self report data. However, their use of these data in their article is problematic, with predictable
consequences for their results.
6.1 | Omitted and dated studies
Scurich and John leave the most recent national study of child sexual abuse known to the police out of their
discussion. Finkelhor et al. (2012) investigate a nationally representative sample of 4,549 children from ages 1
month to 17 years living in the contiguous United States and estimate that 76.1% of sexual abuse by a nonspecified
adult and 13.1% of peer sexual abuse is known to the police. These numbers are significantly higher than those
Scurich and John report in their article (pp. 161–162); they refer only to a much earlier study by R. F. Hanson
et al. (1999), which suggests that 12% of child sexual assaults in their sample were reported to police, and to an
even earlier study, by Mullen et al. (1993), which finds that 8% of child sexual assaults they study were reported to
authorities. Assuming the accuracy of the the older studies, Finkelhor et al. (2012) explain why there has been such
a sharp increase in reporting: “Considerable efforts have been made during the last generation to encourage
children and their families to report victimization to authorities” (p. 1).
Scurich and John also omit any discussion of a recent study of victim reporting by Jones et al. (2009). Over an
18‐month period, Jones et al. (2009) interviewed female sexual assault victims who presented at an urban clinic or
emergency department in Michigan. These interviews started in 2001, which is decades later than most of those in
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the Daly and Bouhours (2010) study. Jones et al. (2009) study 424 women, and of these, 75% (318) reported their
sexual assault to the police. These women may be unrepresentative, but at least for certain groups of women and
certain serious types of sexual offenses—those resulting in medical evaluation or treatment—reporting rates may
be closer to the “optimistic” estimate rather than the much lower values pushed by Scurich and John. We mention
this study in particular only to point out that such high reporting rates have been found in some contexts in the
literature, even though Scurich and John claim otherwise, and to challenge their assertion that, “at a minimum, a
majority of sexual offenses do not get reported by victims to the police” (p. 162).
6.2 | Questionable assumption
The studies Scurich and John cite offer insight into the probability that a sexual crime is reported conditional on it
occurring, Pr or P(Report). However, given the motivation for their work, Scurich and John are not actually
interested in their analysis in the rate of reporting for all sexual crimes; critical to their work is only the probability
that a sexual offense is reported by the victim conditional on it being committed by an individual previously con-
victed of a sexual offense, PðReportjCSOÞ. By choosing instead to incorporate estimated reporting probabilities
about sexual offenses generally, and not sexual offenses that count as sexual recidivism, Scurich and John implicitly
assume that the probability that a victim (or someone else) reports a sexual crime to law enforcement is inde-
pendent of whether the alleged offender has been convicted of a sexual offense in the past—that is,
PðReportÞ ¼ PðReportjCSOÞ.
There are good reasons to believe this assumption is incorrect. The most important reason is that victims may
be much more likely than they normally would be to report a crime committed against them by someone with a
criminal history of sexual offending, especially if that individual is subject to community notification requirements.
Because most sexual offenses are perpetrated by intimates or acquaintances, victims are likely to know if the
person who victimizes them has been convicted of a sexual crime in the past—even if the individual is not listed on a
public sexual offender registry [National Crime Victimization Analysis Tool (NVAT) Report, 2020].
Awareness that an offender has a criminal history is particularly relevant to reporting behavior because one of
the primary reasons victims give for not reporting their victimization is that they assume the police will not believe
them or will blame them for what happened. Jones et al. (2009), which we discuss above, conduct a cross‐sectional
survey of female sexual assault victims presenting at an urban clinic or emergency department after their attack to
identify the reasons women might choose not to report their rape to the police. They find that 51% of nonreporting
victims were reluctant to report because “police would be insensitive or blame me”; 49% explained that “[s]ome
people will not believe me”; 63% indicated that “[i]t would be just his word against mine”; and 73% worried that
“[o]ther people will think I am responsible” (p. 420).
The fact that an individual has a criminal record for other sexual offenses may make a victim more confident
that her account will be taken seriously and thus may make her more likely to report being victimized. It certainly
seems unlikely that police would begin by assuming that an allegation that a convicted sex offender committed a
new sexual offense was frivolous. The findings emerging from Jones et al. (2009) suggest that such confidence in a
victim's account could lead to a massive increase in reporting. Moreover, a relatively high chance of reporting is also
probable for an offense committed by a stranger because victims are generally much more likely to report sexual
offenses perpetrated against them by strangers (Chen & Ullman, 2010).
There are two other reasons to suspect that average sexual offense reporting probabilities are systematically
lower than the reporting probabilities for offenses committed by individuals with sexual offense convictions. First,
when it comes to publicly registered individuals, we might understandably anticipate some number of reports
occurring even when the potential recidivist commits no crime—either because of mistaken identity (with victims
identifying “usual suspects”) or because of hostility toward individuals previously convicted of sexual offenses. This
bias cuts in the opposite direction, nudging reporting rates closer to actual offense rates. Second, further
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undermining Scurich and John's assumption is the possibility that victims who know the offender—that is, most
victims—may be relatively less likely to report a crime if that person is not an already‐convicted and labelled “sex
offender.” In particular, victims may hesitate to report a crime for fear of “ruining someone's life” due to the stigma
and burdens associated with a sexual offense conviction.
Finally, a large majority of sexual crimes (perhaps > 90%) are committed by individuals who have not been
previously convicted of a sexual crime (Sandler et al., 2008). Consequently, the average reporting probabilities in
the studies cited by Scurich and John are made up primarily of the reporting probabilities for crimes committed by
individuals without a criminal history of sexual crime convictions. This fact—combined with the special consider-
ations surrounding reporting a crime against an individual with an extant sexual offense record—suggests that
“average” reporting rates are a poor proxy for the reporting rates for crimes committed by sexual recidivists.
6.3 | Significance
If victims are systematically more likely to report crimes committed by individuals previously convicted of a sexual
offense, then the reporting probabilities Scurich and John use in their simulations are lower than they should be
because PðReportjCSOÞ > PðReportÞ. This relationship is important because the difference between the “actual”
and “observed” recidivism rates is proportional to the reporting and conviction probabilities they assume. The
greater the probability of reporting (or conviction), the smaller the difference between actual and observed rates.
By using smaller reporting probabilities, Scurich and John necessarily inflate their hypothetical “actual” recidivism
rates.
7 | UNDERLYING ASSUMPTION: CHANCE OF SUCCESSFUL PROSECUTION
The final variable in Scurich and John's probabilistic model is Pc, the likelihood of a successful prosecution
given that the sexual offense was reported to the police. Scurich and John cite no studies to benchmark their
assumptions about this variable, and they proceed instead by hazarding three possible values: Pc = 0.25, 0.50,
and 0.75. We note just how important using, say, their low value is to generating their hypothetical “actual”
recidivism rates—it effectively assumes that recidivism rates are many times higher than what we observe.
Although we agree that it requires some effort for prosecutors to secure convictions in sexual crime cases, the
likelihood of a conviction (conditional on a report—i.e., law enforcement becoming aware of an actual
victimization) in a case involving an alleged offender who has already been convicted in the past of a sexual
crime seems likely to be very high, especially if we include the possibility of plea bargains, which may be easier
for defendants to stomach if they already have a sexual offense conviction in their past, and the possibility of a
wrongful conviction of an innocent individual, which may be significantly more likely when the defendant is
publicly registered as a “sex offender.”
When a victim reports that they have been sexually assaulted by an individual previously convicted of a sexual
offense, the alleged offender is already known to the criminal justice system, which makes a difference at every
stage of the process. The police are gatekeepers, and we acknowledge that they are notoriously reluctant to believe
victims of sexual crimes (Campbell, 2005). If a report is made about an individual with a prior conviction for a sexual
offense, however, that person's criminal record, which the police can easily access, will inevitably make the alle-
gation seem more credible. Moreover, the police can consult already‐collected fingerprints and/or DNA, more
easily secure a search warrant and gather inculpatory evidence, and locate and arrest the individual with less
difficulty. An arrest, in turn, allows the police to conduct a search incident to arrest (which might lead to more
evidence) and interrogate the suspect (which might lead to more evidence and/or a confession, perhaps for other
crimes for which the police had not received a report). Someone with an existing record may be less likely to be
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released on bail, making it more difficult to assemble a defense down the road. All of this makes the police more
likely to refer the case for prosecution.
The prosecution in turn will be more likely to file charges because they know they are highly likely to secure a
conviction—even if the case goes to trial. Their chances are not just very high because of the evidence likely to be
compiled by the police, but also because prosecutors have the upper hand in any plea bargaining that occurs. The
Supreme Court held in Bordenkircher v. Hayes (1978) that a prosecutor may carry out a threat made during plea
negotiations to add additional, more serious charges if a defendant rejects an offer, and there are many possible
additional charges and sentencing enhancements from which to choose at both the state (National Conference of
State Legislatures, 2006) and federal levels (Myers, 2015). Therefore, it seems highly likely, if not almost certain,
that a case referred by the police involving a sexual crime will end in a conviction of some sort, and prosecutors are
unlikely to use their discretion to reduce any sexual offense charge to a nonsexual charge when the allegation is
sexual in nature and the defendant already has a prior sexual offense conviction.
Should the defendant decide to opt for a trial, evidentiary rules increase the prosecution's chance of winning,
which of course influences the defendant's decision of whether to decline a plea offer and choose a trial. (We note
that, conditional on a prosecutor pursuing charges, the defendant is very likely—well in excess of 90% in many
jurisdictions—to plead guilty.) Under the Federal Rules of Evidence and most state analogs, prosecutors are allowed
to introduce propensity evidence in sexual offense cases under the theory that individuals convicted of sexual
crimes (especially those convicted of child molestation) are especially likely to reoffend (Lave & Orenstein, 2013).
There is virtually no time bar to evidence of prior sexual misconduct, and it can take the form of uncharged al-
legations, dismissed charges, convictions, and even acquittals. Such evidence is specifically designed to make it
easier for the prosecution to prevail in an otherwise weak case.
For all of these reasons, the range of values Scurich and John assume for Pc is unreasonably low (Pc = 0.25,
0.50, and 0.75). Recall, we are assuming a reported sexual offense against an individual who has a record of
committing sexual offenses in a world with great pressure on prosecutors to secure convictions, especially in these
cases and especially against recidivists, and in a world of pervasive plea bargaining, expansive substantive criminal
law, flexible evidentiary rules, and other procedures that make it particularly difficult for a defendant with a sexual
offense record to prevail—even if wrongly accused. Even if we assume that Scurich and John's probabilistic model is
otherwise valid, all three values they use for Pc artificially inflate their hypothetical “actual” recidivism by a sig-
nificant amount.
8 | ASSESSING THE MATHEMATICS BEHIND THE MODEL
We demonstrate above that the data Scurich and John use and the empirical assumptions they make are prob-
lematic, and that they are likely, especially when combined to magnify each other, to produce inaccurate conclu-
sions that are predictably biased in a certain direction—in particular, toward inaccurately high hypothetical sexual
offense recidivism rates. We now briefly turn to the mathematics behind their model. In order to more fully un-
derstand Scurich and John's analysis and what drives their conclusions, we replicate their model. Scurich and John
generously shared their work with us,16 and we were able to reproduce their simulation and results in Stata using
the distributions stated in their Figure 2 (p. 164). In what follows, we show that behind the seeming neutrality of
their setup is a structural bias.
8.1 | Does the model actually assume different propensities of offending?
Scurich and John state that unlike early models of offending and recividism, they “assume a diverse population of
offenders with different propensities of offending” (p. 166). Such an assumption would be an improvement over
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earlier models because it would more accurately reflect the true universe of individuals at risk of reoffending. As we
explain in Section 5 of this paper, individuals with sexual offense convictions are not monolithic. The likelihood of
reoffending varies with the offense of conviction, prior offense history, family relationships, and various de-
mographic factors such as age at time of release from custody (R. K. Hanson, 1998). As we show below, however,
Scurich and John's approach does not seem to work in the way they report that it does. In fact, their complex
process for estimating recidivism rates that we describe in Figure 1 can be simplified to a single step, which we
show in Figure 3. Rather than assuming that individuals at risk of recidivating have different propensities for
reoffending, at least on paper their model assumes that all 100 offenders in their simulation have the same
probability of recidivating (P½Recid:� ¼ µ=ð1 þ µÞ). Scurich and John use a Poisson distribution, where the
parameter (λ) follows a gamma distribution; this is more commonly known as a gamma‐Poisson distribution with
parameters (α¼ µ; β). As Scurich and John describe it, they “assume that λi follows an exponential distribution,
which is a special case of a gamma distribution” (p. 166). So, under this assumption, Scurich and John actually use a
special case of the gamma‐Poisson distribution with parameters (α¼ µ; β¼ 1), which is analogous to a geometric
distribution with parameter (p ¼ 1=ð1 þ µÞ).18
In the context of their model, the number of offenses committed by offender i—denoted Si—has a geometric
distribution (p) in which PðSi ¼ xÞ = p ð1 − pÞx. Using this distribution, the probability that each offender commits no
new offenses is p [¼ PðSi ¼ 0Þ ¼ ðpÞðð1 − pÞ0Þ ¼ p¼ 1=ð1 þ µÞ]. Conversely, the probability of recidivating (i.e.,
committing at least one new offense) is 1 − p [ ¼ PðSi ≥ 1Þ ¼ 1 − PðSi ¼ 0Þ ¼ 1 − p ¼ µ =ð1 þ µÞ]. As a result of
the previous statement, we can say that Scurich and John's model assumes that each offender will recidivate with
the same probability: µ=ð1 þ µÞ.
But Scurich and John choose µ, implicitly assuming the same probability of recidivism for all offenders. In light
of this facet of the model, statements such as “even a mean rate of 1.0 sexual offenses over the time period per
individual results in an actual recidivism rate of 50% over the time period” (p. 169) are neither surprising nor
informative. As Table 2 shows, for a mean rate, µ, of 1.0, the authors simply assert that each offender has a 50%
probability of recidivism (1/[1+1]). If each trial in their simulation consists of 100 offenders, with each assumed to
have a 50% chance of reoffending, is it surprising that over 1,000 trials an average of 50 out of 100 reoffend?19 Put
another way, the model implicitly assumes a rate of recidivism by choosing a distribution and the parameters for
that distribution. Table 2 shows this mapping.
We now turn to their Figure 6 (p. 168), which we recreate using our analysis that precisely mimics their model.
As presented by Scurich and John, Figure 6 shows that as µ (i.e., the assumed average number of offenses per
offender) increases, the recidivism rate produced by their model also increases. This relationship makes sense
F I G U R E 3 Simplified simulation process [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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intuitively, but it is also a mechanical relationship that derives from their assumptions. If we assume that offenders
commit more crimes on average, then we should expect more potential offenders to commit at least one new crime
over any period of time.
At first glance this relationship might appear reasonable (Figure 4). However, if you look closely you will notice
that the horizontal distance between dots does not match the increase in µ. Each dot has the same horizontal
distance from the previous dot despite different increases in µ (i.e., if the x‐axis shows µ, then µ ¼ 1=16 to µ ¼1=8
should be closer together than µ = 16 and µ¼ 8). What Scurich and John have done is plot the natural log of µ, lnðµÞ,
which means moving one dot to the right doubles the value of µ. If you correctly plot the relationship between µ and
recidivism, their analysis produces Figure 5.
Now we see a completely different relationship; recidivism increases dramatically when μ is small, with
diminishing returns as µ increases. Most importantly, this figure shows that Scurich and John's model is extremely
sensitive to their choice of µ when µ is two or less. If the “actual” propensity parameter is two or less, the recidivism
rate produced by their model can be wildly inaccurate even when using a propensity parameter that is close to the
T A B L E 2 Probability of recidivism assumed by Scurich and John's model










F I G U R E 4 Scurich and John's Figure 6 (replicated)20 [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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“actual” value. Suppose the “actual” µ is 0.5 (i.e., the mean number of sexual offenses across all offenders in a given
period is 0.5), but Scurich and John believe it is actually equal to 1. Their model would suggest that the recidivism
rate is 50%, but the “actual” recidivism rate would be 33.3%. Of the scenarios considered by Scurich and John
(Table 1, p. 170), 58.6% (21/36) involve calibrating propensities of two or less, underscoring the relevance and
impact of this limitation.
8.2 | Significance
Scurich and John claim that their model allows them “to estimate actual recidivism rates for sexual offenders given
observed rates of reoffending” (p. 171). If this is true, it is true only in the narrowest sense. By assuming µ, the
authors implicitly assume the same probability of recidivating for all individuals from the beginning. Thus, any
relevance of their hypothetical “actual” recidivism rates to real‐world “observed” recidivism rates is minimal.
Beyond the simple fact that not all sexual offenses are included in existing recidivism rate calculations, their
analysis is simply a set of hypotheticals turning on (mostly unreasonable) assumptions about the distribution of
tendencies to reoffend and probabilities of reporting and conviction. This exercise considers a wide range of
parameters—some of which are implausible—and can, unsurprisingly, produce virtually every possible recidivism
rate, from low to very high, depending on how you combine the assumptions. Regardless of the parameter values
chosen, a sensitivity analysis shows that the results are highly sensitive to small changes in many of the values,
suggesting the model is as likely to mislead as it is to inform.
9 | PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In their paper, Scurich and John purport to show that individuals with a sexual crime conviction pose a far greater
risk than most experts believe, the implication being that society may require strong measures to control sexual
recidivism—and, thus, that we should be wary of any attempt to more accurately target existing approaches.
However, in this response, we show that the model they use to measure what they call “the dark figure of
recidivism” produces little of practical value to policy‐makers or judges. The numbers they offer are inflated by the
F I G U R E 5 Scurich and John's Figure 6 (corrected) [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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benchmarking choices they make, as well as the very strong (and inaccurate) underlying assumptions about
reoffending behavior and victim and law enforcement behavior on which they rely.
Where does that leave us? Instead of imposing coercive measures like civil commitment, registration obliga-
tions, community notification, and residency restrictions that research shows are deeply problematic, ineffective,
and perhaps counterproductive from a public‐safety perspective, government should instead focus its limited re-
sources on deterring the potential offenders who are now often overlooked and present, as a group, a much larger
threat—intimates and acquaintances who have never been caught or convicted of a sexual crime. The vast majority
of sexual offenses are committed by individuals who are not potential recidivists, and although some who have
been convicted of such crimes do reoffend upon release, recidivism numbers are sufficiently low that it makes little
public‐safety sense to focus so much effort and so many resources on what is a relatively small population. This is
true even if we leave to one side the fact that there is no evidence that registration, notification, and residence
restrictions are effective at reducing recidivism (whether it is low or high) and even some evidence that these laws
actually increase recidivism by exacerbating well‐validated recidivism risk factors (Prescott, 2016; Prescott &
Rockoff, 2011).
To confirm that there are far fewer victims of sexual recidivists than victims of individuals never before
convicted of a sexual offense, we return to the 2003 and 2019 DOJ studies, both of which show that individuals
released after committing a sexual offense commit considerably fewer new sexual crimes in total than individuals
who were released after committing other crimes. (The 2016 study does not provide the information necessary to
make similar calculations for its sample population.) Although individuals convicted of sexual offenses in the 2003
study were four times more likely to be rearrested for a sexual crime than other releasees, as a group they
committed far fewer sexual crimes in ensuing years than releasees without prior sexual offense convictions. Of the
9,691 individuals with sexual crime convictions released in 2003, 517 (5.3%) were rearrested for a new sexual
crime as compared with 3,328 (1.3%) of the 262,420 individuals with nonsexual convictions released that same year
(p. 24). Langan et al. (2003) explain that if you assume each releasee victimized no more than one victim, the
combined total number of new sexual crimes is 3,845 (517 + 3,328), implying that individuals with sexual crime
convictions account for just 13% of the 3,845 sexual crimes committed by releasees, and individuals with no record
of a sexual offense account for 87% of the total (p. 24). Put differently, individuals released for something other
than a sexual crime commit more than six times as many new sexual crimes as released sexual offenders (Langan
et al., 2003). Importantly, these back‐of‐the‐envelope calculations—which ignore entirely all sexual offenses
committed by individuals with no prior convictions whatsoever—align generally with research indicating that a
large majority (>90%) of sexual offenses involve individuals with no prior sexual offense record (see, e.g., Sandler
et al., 2008).
Moreover, according to the 2019 DOJ study, individuals with sexual offense records were only around three
times more likely to be arrested for rape or sexual assault than other released prisoners (7.7% vs. 2.3%). (Alper &
Durose, 2019, p. 1). (For those paying attention, the risk posed by individuals released after imprisonment for a
sexual offense appears to be getting closer over time to the sexual offense risk posed by other releasees.) As
before, individuals with a prior record involving a sexual offense committed far fewer sexual crimes in the
aggregate than other releasees. The former accounted for 16% of the 12,000 arrests for rape or sexual assault that
occurred among all prisoners released in 2005 in the study's 30 states. Other types of releasees were responsible
for the other 84% (Alper & Durose, 2019, p. 11).
It is worth reiterating that sexual offense recidivism appears to be at best unaffected by postrelease laws like
registration and notification (Logan & Prescott, 2021; Prescott & Rockoff, 2011). In such a light, the calculations
above support investing in policies to reduce victimization by “first‐time” offenders. Such policies are likely to be a
much better use of society's time and resources than focusing on recidivists. Indeed, one could understandably
worry that our focus on sexual offense recidivism has distracted policy‐makers from the goal that really matters,
which is reducing the overall frequency of sexual offending behavior.
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10 | CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we revisit Scurich and John's (2019) attempt to assess the size and scope of the “dark figure” of sexual
recidivism. We offer criticisms of many aspects of their work, including their selection and interpretation of their
benchmarking studies as well as their model's empirical assumptions and its basic construction, all of which operate
to produce biased estimates of sexual recidivism. In the end, the work amounts to an inflation of the unrepre-
sentative “observed” recidivism rates they cite by multiplying them by a function of Pr and Pc that is not well
grounded in a thorough understanding of existing research and the criminal justice system.
The gravity of these problems is exacerbated by the context in which they occur. Individuals convicted of
sexual offenses are some of the most maligned members of society, and they suffer under onerous criminal
sanctions and civil obligations (Ellman, 2021). These policies and practices follow from fears about the “dark figure”;
indeed, society has decided to use its limited law enforcement resources to incarcerate many of these individuals
indefinitely in locked mental hospitals rather than devote these resources to the much more serious problem—
disrupting first‐time offenses, which make up as many as 90% of sexual offenses in this country.
A study that can be interpreted as rigorous support for a very large “dark figure” is likely to further distract
policy‐makers and judges in ways that put more victims at risk and make society less safe. Judges and policy‐makers
already understand the basic idea that “observed rates” do not capture all instances of recidivism. But decision‐
makers are likely to be comforted to see actual numbers in a peer‐reviewed paper. Yet these numbers are driven
entirely by Scurich and John's assumptions, which are not well justified, and ultimately misleading when brought
together in their model. Judges and legislators must peek under the hood to see this, and we hope this paper offers
a guide to what's going on in Scurich and John's analysis, and how relatively small tweaks to their choices will tell
entirely different stories.
ENDNOTES
1 Emphasis in the original.
2 Emphasis in the original.
3 Emphasis in the original.
4 We say “in very rough terms” because we are technically conflating recidivism rates with the average number of
recidivist crimes per offender for the population. More precisely, they “inflate” the value of μ0 in their model (which is
the mean number of offenses per offender for the population) by 1=ðPr � PcÞ: They argue that we only observe Pr � Pc
percent of (recidivist) offenses, so the population average number of offenses is much larger. The scaling factor to go
from observed to actual recidivism rate is Ract ¼ Robs=ðRobs þ PrPcð1 − RobsÞÞ.
5 To help explain what the parameter μ0 represents, consider a group of 100 offenders. If these 100 individuals have a
value of μ0 = 2, then the average number of new offenses committed by an offender is two, and the total number of
offenses committed by the group would be 200. This is an average because some will commit more than two offenses
while others will commit fewer than two.
6 Each offender is assigned a value of λi. If a person has a λi = 4, then the average number of new offenses this person
commits per trial is 4. This is an average because in some trials they will commit more than four offenses, while in other
trials they will commit fewer than four (see Figure 3, p. 165).
7 We hasten to add that most convictions result from guilty pleas, and that wrongful convictions, especially with respect
to guilty pleas to more minor sexual offenses, seem highly plausible in this context (for instance, when a prosecutor
threatens more serious sexual offense charges against someone with a prior sexual offense conviction). Scurich and
John do not deflate their recidivism estimates to account for this upward bias.
8 Arrests for technical violations of the conditions of supervision are excluded from the study. Also excluded are arrests
for minor offenses including breaches against public peace, invasion of privacy, prostitution, obstruction of justice, liquor
law violations, and traffic offenses.
9 We describe R. K. Hanson's criticism of the RCMP policies for retaining criminal records in more detail in Section 3.2.
10 E‐mail on file with authors. We are grateful to R. K. Hanson for his helpful and candid explanation.
11 The study period began in 1959 and formally ended on January 1, 1985. The last charge posted was in October 1984.
Prentky et al. characterize it as a 25 year study, and so we do as well.
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12 On 11 April 2020, one of us (TRL) wrote to Amy Phenix, an author of the R. K. Hanson et al. (2014) study, to clarify how
the authors define recidivism. On 13 April 2020, Phenix confirmed that the article uses arrest—not charge—as the
recidivism measure. E‐mail on file with authors.
13 It was actually R. K. Hanson (2006) who clarified that all of the persons in the Langevin et al. (2004) study came from the
same hospital (p. 103).
14 Emphasis added.
15 For a different depiction of the 2019 DOJ findings, see Figure 2. It provides a visual display of the percentage of those
convicted of rape and/or sexual assault who were arrested for a rape or sexual assault by year after release. We include
a trend line to show that the rate decreases over time.
16 On 26 November 2019, we e‐mailed Scurich and John requesting a copy of their data and programs to back up their
modeling. In January 2020, they shared with us summary results for the nine simulations they used to produce Figure 6
(p. 169) in their paper. Unfortunately, they did not include the syntax necessary to reproduce the Monte Carlo simu-
lations, such as commands to generate variable distributions. Fortunately, it turned out we did not need anything else
from them; we were able to reproduce what they must have done. Scurich and John used a now‐defunct Excel add‐in
tool to generate their results. We assume we have everything they had that was helpful to replicating their analysis, and
we are grateful for their assistance.
17 Source: Alper and Durose (2019).
18 A unique property of the geometric distribution is that it is memoryless, meaning the number of offenses an individual
commits before today does not impact the probability of reoffending in the future. For example, suppose an individual
commits X new offenses in the first half of the period. The probability that the individual will commit at least one more
offense (i.e., Si ≥ X þ 1) by the end of the period is the same regardless of X. Using a geometric distribution, as Scurich
and John have inadvertently done, assumes that the likelihood of an individual reoffending is the same for each day and
does not depend on what happened yesterday.
19 As an analogy, consider flipping a coin 100 times and counting the number of times it lands on heads. The probability of
landing heads is 50% for each flip, so after 100 flips, we expect to have about half land heads. In any set of 100 flips the
number of heads may be a few more or less than 50, but if we repeat this 1000 times the average number of heads will
be 50 out of 100 or 50%.
20 Scurich and John (p. 168): “Figure 6 mean number of actual reoffenders (Ns) from a population of N = 100 over a fixed
time period by mean number of sexual offenses per offender over the time period (from 1/16 (= 0.0625) to 16).”
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syntax, µ(real) pr(real) pc(real);
return scalar µ = `µ';
return scalar Pr = `pr';
return scalar Pc = `pc';
set obs 100;
gen λi = rexponential(`µ');
gen Si = rpoisson(λi);
gen Ns = (Si > 0);
gen Ri = rbinomial(Si, `pr');
replace Ri = 0 if Ri = = . & Si = = 0;
replace Ri = Si if `pr' = = 1;
gen Nr = (Ri > 0);
gen Ci = rbinomial(Ri, `pc');
replace Ci = 0 if Ci = = . & Ri = = 0;
gen Nc = (Ci > 0);
tabstat Si Ri Ci, s(mean) save;
mat A = r(StatTotal);
return scalar Si = A[1,1];
return scalar Ri = A[1,2];
return scalar Ci = A[1,3];
tabstat Ns Nr Nc, s(sum) save;
mat B = r(StatTotal);
return scalar Ns = B[1,1];
return scalar Nr = B[1,2];
return scalar Nc = B[1,3];
end;
set seed 3242020;
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local j = 0;
forvalues i = 0(1)8 {;
local mu = (2^`i')/16; /* 1/16 1/8 1/4 1/2 1 2 4 8 16 */
foreach r of numlist 1 .35 .15 {; /*P(Report) */
foreach c of numlist .75 .50 .25 {; /*P(Conviction) */
simulate Si = r(Si) Ri = r(Ri) Ci = r(Ci) Ns = r(Ns) Nr = r(Nr) Nc = r(Nc) Pr = r(Pr) Pc = r(Pc), reps(1000) nodots:
MCsim, µ(`mu') pr(`r') pc(`c');
gen µ = (2^`i')/16;
gen trial = _n;
if `j' = = 0 {;










/* Alternative Method ‐ Nc in each trial is Binomial(n = 100, q) */
gen p = µ/(1+µ);
gen alpha = µ*Pr*Pc;
gen q = alpha/(1+alpha);
gen Ns_eqn = rbinomial(100, p);
gen Nc_eqn = rbinomial(100, q);
order trial;
save "`folder'\CalibrationData.dta", replace;
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